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Based on original trader surveys, this paper examines how agricultural traders operate in Benin and 
Malawi. Results indicate that the largest transaction costs are search and transport. The use of modern 
technology is limited. Search methods rely principally on personal visits by the trader, and quality control 
requires the presence of the trader at the time of purchase. This increases costs, as the trader has to travel a 
lot, and makes it difficult for trading enterprises to grow. Since enterprises remain very small, personal 
transport and search time represent a non-negligible share of marketing costs. 
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S’appuyant sur des études originales des marchands, cet article examine la façon d’opérer des marchands 
agricoles au Bénin et au Malawi. Les résultats indiquent que les coûts de transaction les plus importants 
sont la recherche et le transport. L’utilisation d’une technologie moderne est restreinte. Les méthodes de 
recherches dépendent principalement des visites personnelles de la part du marchand, et le contrôle de la 
qualité exige sa présence au moment de l’achat. Ceci augmente les coûts car le marchand doit beaucoup 
se déplacer et, par conséquent, ralentit la croissance des entreprises commerciales. Puisque les entreprises 
demeurent très petites, le transport personnel et le temps accordé à la recherche représentent une part non 
négligeable des coûts de commercialisation.  
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1. Introduction 
Many studies have investigated the integration of agricultural markets in post-market reform sub-Saharan 
Africa (e.g. Dercon 1995; Badiane & Shively 1998). These studies rely primarily on analyzing price co-
movements at the market level. While such analysis can document market segmentation, it does not 
explain why markets are poorly integrated or what constraints economic agents face.  
An enduring puzzle in the market literature in sub-Saharan Africa is that, despite liberalization and 
reforms, agricultural markets have remained relatively unsophisticated and marketing margins high (e.g. 
Beynon et al. 1992; Jayne & Jones 1997). Relatively few studies have addressed the microeconomic 
behavior of individual traders (e.g. Bryceson 1993; Barrett 1997; Gabre-Madhin 1998; Fafchamps & 
Minten 1999; Fafchamps et al. 2005). These studies highlight the importance of transaction costs, the role 
of intermediaries and the importance of relationships and social capital.  
This paper attempts to throw new light on agricultural market performance by describing in detail trader 
characteristics and behavior. Using survey data from Benin and Malawi, we examine how traders’ assets – 
including financial, physical, human, and social capital – influence their commercial activities and, 
ultimately, their capacity to undertake spatial and temporal arbitrage. We empirically investigate traders’ 
assets and trading practices and link these not only to evidence on traders’ gross margins but also to their 
net margins using detailed data on marketing, operating and transaction costs.  
This approach is important for a number of reasons. First, despite reforms, agricultural traders in 
liberalized markets across sub-Saharan Africa continue to operate in an environment of suspicion, viewed 
by policymakers and laypersons alike as speculative, usurious and benefiting from excessive profits. 
Second, an emerging conclusion of the post-reform era is that market liberalization is necessary but not 
sufficient to bring about efficient markets. Thus, a closer look at the individual determinants of 
performance is warranted. Finally, in the wake of reforms, it remains unclear what is the appropriate role of 
the public sector. Understanding the constraints market participants face can highlight areas where 
intervention can have an impact.  
We compare the performance of traders in Benin and Malawi. In Benin, in francophone West Africa, 
private market activity has a long history and government intervention has traditionally been limited, 
except in cotton (Kherallah et al. 2000). In sharp contrast, Malawi, along with others in eastern and 
southern Africa, has experienced, up to recently, extensive state intervention in marketing, with the stated 
purpose of protecting smallholders (Jayne & Jones 1997).  
 
2. Agricultural markets in Benin and Malawi 
The two study countries differ markedly in their history of policy intervention in agricultural markets. In 
Benin, the Office National des Céréales (ONC) was created in 1983. With the help of local organizations 
known as Centres d’Action Régionales pour le Développement Rural (CARDER), it attempted 
unsuccessfully to control 25% of the cereals market, reaching only 5% in 1990 owing to a lack of human 
and financial resources (Badiane et al. 1997). With the exception of the 1976–1977 period, market prices 
of cereals were never controlled and private traders largely dominated food markets, even prior to 
liberalization. The market reforms launched in 1990 effectively dismantled the ONC and the CARDERs, 
transforming the ONC into the Office National d’Appui à la Sécurité Alimentaire (ONASA), responsible 
for supporting food security and providing market information and extension to farmers. In the wake of 
market reforms ONASA’s marketing role is extremely small, controlling only 0.15% of the annual traded 





In Malawi the government established the Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation 
(ADMARC) as a monopsonistic buying agent for smallholders’ maize, at guaranteed fixed prices. 
ADMARC provided pan-territorial and pan-seasonal prices for farmers, which meant it had to subsidize 
maize prices with export earnings from tobacco. As the world prices for tobacco deteriorated in the early 
1980s, its ability to continue maize subsidies was eroded. In 1981, Malawi embarked on a series of 
structural adjustment programs, which entailed adopting a flexible exchange rate regime and moving 
slowly toward liberalizing its price and marketing policies. Although the World Bank initially supported 
ADMARC’s activities, it disagreed on the level of food prices relative to export prices (Seppala 1997). In 
1987, a new series of structural adjustment loans was launched, on the condition of completely privatizing 
maize marketing. However, although private trading was allowed in this period, producer prices remained 
fixed by the government until as late as 1995, when a price band was established (Badiane et al. 1997). At 
the time of our survey, ADMARC was in charge of administering the price band and of acting as buyer of 
last resort. Despite privatization and the closing of a number of ADMARC buying centers, ADMARC 
remains dominant in the maize market, with private traders engaged in bulking for delivery to ADMARC 
(Beynon et al. 1992). 
 
3. The survey 
Surveys of traders of domestic agricultural products were conducted in 1999/2000 in Benin (August–
September 1999) and Malawi (August 1999–February 2000). A market-level survey was also conducted to 
obtain information on the marketing environment. The work was coordinated by the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Oxford University and the World Bank. Data collection in the field was 
directed by the Laboratoire d’Analyse et de Recherche Économique et Sociale (LARES) in Benin, and by 
the Agricultural Policy Research Unit (APRU) in Malawi.  
Both surveys focus on agricultural traders at both the wholesaler and retailer level.
1 The survey sites are 
market towns active in agricultural products. In Benin 24 markets were selected and in Malawi 40, based 
on their importance for trade and the availability of secondary price data. Because neither country had 
reliable census information on its population of traders, a census of traders was conducted in each selected 
market.  
In Benin, the survey team counted all traders present at the market on a given day. This count was 
supplemented by lists of traders obtained from ONASA and the regional bureaus of the Ministry of 
Commerce. These lists include larger traders who need not have a stall at the market itself. The two lists 
and the count were combined to construct a frame from which a sample was randomly drawn, resulting in a 
total sample of 663 agricultural traders.  
In Malawi, a reconnaissance survey of traders was conducted in July–August 1999 to count and identify 
traders according to their status (independent, buying agent, or selling agent), their level (retail or 
wholesale) and the types of products they trade. The name, type, and location of traders from this survey 
                                                 
1 Efforts to include agricultural inputs and cash crops in the survey were largely unsuccessful. In Benin, it became clear 
at the piloting stage that the fertilizer and seed trade is closely linked to the production of cotton. Cotton marketing is 
under the monopoly of a parastatal enterprise, the Societé Nationale de Promotion Agricole (SONAPRA). Input trading 
is done primarily through village cooperatives called Groupements Villageois (GV) rather than by individual traders. 
The GVs purchase inputs from nine government-licensed fertilizer importers and distribute these inputs among their 
members. The marketing of cotton, the dominant export crop, is done entirely through SONAPRA. 
In the case of Malawi, the distribution of fertilizer and other agricultural inputs is dominated by a few very large 
firms, such as OPTICHEM and Norsk/Hydro. Inputs are distributed throughout the country by traders operating as 
selling agents for large corporations. A specific survey was organized for these selling agents, who do not conduct 
purchases but sell independently. These results are not discussed here because they are not immediately comparable with 
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were entered into a spreadsheet and the sample was drawn randomly from the census data. A total sample 
of 738 traders was interviewed in Malawi. For both countries, the total sample of independent traders is 
1371.  
The questionnaire covered the following main areas: (a) characteristics of the trader and trading enterprise; 
(b) factors of productions and operating costs; (c) trading activities and marketing costs; and (d) 
relationships and coordination costs. Data were also collected on search behavior and costs, quality 
inspection, contract enforcement and dispute settlement, information and property rights enforcement.  
 
4. Characteristics of the enterprise 
We begin by providing an overview of the main characteristics of trading enterprises in the two surveyed 
countries.  
4.1 Specialization 
The traders surveyed deal primarily in maize, beans, and roots and tubers. Together, these crops account 
for 80 to 90% of the main crops traded. None of the surveyed Beninese traders deals in cotton, the 
country’s main cash crop. At the time of the survey, cotton marketing was entirely in the hands of the 
government marketing board. A small number of the surveyed Malawian traders deal in tobacco, the 
principal export crop. This is the result of a relatively recent liberalization in tobacco marketing. Less than 
five of the surveyed traders sell chemical inputs such as fertilizer or pesticides. 
Some traders – 12% in Benin, 25% in Malawi – sell products other than agricultural, but on average the 
surveyed traders derive 95% of their trade revenue from agricultural trade. Traders are thus moderately 
specialized by sector. But they do not specialize by crop: two thirds of all the surveyed traders sell more 
than one agricultural product and 45% sell more than two. In addition, 23% of traders in Malawi and 30% 
in Benin have an activity other than trade. In Benin, this is overwhelmingly farming; in Malawi, it is 
overwhelmingly non-agricultural trade.  
Nearly all traders have a principal market from which they organize their activities. In that market, most of 
them have a place – stall, store, shed – for their exclusive use. Three quarters of surveyed traders also 
operate in other markets – on average 1.3 to 1.6 purchase markets and 0.3 to 0.5 sales markets. This 
suggests that traders normally base their operation at their sales market and buy from one or two other 
markets.  
Traders are not fully specialized by function in the marketing chain. Most are retailers but half of the 
Beninese retailers and a quarter of the Malawian ones also operate as wholesalers. One sixth of the 
Beninese traders and a quarter of the Malawian ones specialize in wholesale only. Most traders – 48% of 
all retailers in Benin and 74% in Malawi – buy at least some of their stock directly from farmers. This 
apparent lack of functional specialization makes it hazardous to categorize respondents by their function in 
the marketing chain. A very small proportion of surveyed traders also operate as buying or selling agents 
for other traders.  
4.2 Ownership 
The overwhelming majority of independent trading enterprises are held in sole ownership by a local 
resident who is also a national of the country studied. Only 30 of the 1400 surveyed traders are foreign 
nationals, of which all except one are African. In Benin, 80% of traders are women as compared with 36% 





all traders are married. Malawian traders are on average younger (33) than in Benin (41), and much better 
educated, averaging 5.6 years of schooling in Malawi and 2.0 in Benin. Two thirds of the surveyed 
Beninese traders have no education, as opposed to only one tenth of Malawian traders.  
Religion varies between the two countries, with 82% of Malawian traders describing themselves as 
Christian while 43% of Beninese traders say they are Muslim and 41% followers of traditional beliefs. In 
terms of wealth, a quarter of Beninese respondents own their home, compared with three quarters of 
Malawian respondents. At $13,700, the value of a Beninese home, however, is about 12 times higher on 
average than a Malawian one (t-value of 6.81) – which may explain why fewer Beninese respondents can 
afford a home. The higher population density and urbanization in Benin probably account for the 
difference in property values.  
The owner of the trading business has typically initiated the business him or herself, and the overwhelming 
majority of respondents started the enterprise without help from anyone. Ten to twenty percent of 
respondents received financial assistance from their family at start-up. Those respondents who did not start 
the business themselves either inherited it or received it as a gift. Virtually none bought their enterprise, 
suggesting that goodwill and reputation are not attached to a specific location, trademark or business name 
(Tadelis 1999). A similar survey in Madagascar indeed showed that African agricultural traders never sell 
under a trademark or business name (Fafchamps & Minten 1999). 
4.3 Experience 
Most traders start with some business experience. Half of the respondents have worked in another business 
before initiating their current trading enterprise. Beninese traders are more experienced than their 
Malawian counterparts, with about twice the number of years of experience both in the current enterprise 
and in a previous business. They are also much more likely to have worked in their parents’ business (67% 
of those with previous business experience) than Malawian traders (4%). Malawian traders acquired prior 
experience almost exclusively through another business of their own. Another difference between the two 
countries is that one sixth of Beninese traders worked as an agent before starting their current trade 
operation, compared with only 3% in Malawi.  
In both countries, one third of traders said their last occupation before becoming involved in agricultural 
trade was in agriculture or food processing, one third in trade, and one third in other non-farm occupations. 
Where previous experience is in trade, in Malawi it is nearly always in non-agricultural trade, compared 
with one third of respondents in Benin. Malawi traders are also more likely to have been wage workers or 
students before entering agricultural trade. They arrive at agricultural trade from a quite different starting 
point. This possibly reflects the impact of trade liberalization that was still recent at the time of the survey.  
Traders’ parental background in the two countries differs little as far as fathers are concerned: they are 
overwhelmingly farmers. Mothers have a variety of occupations, though, with over half of them involved 
in trade in Benin and one tenth in Malawi. Beninese mothers also have a much longer experience in trade 
than their Malawian counterparts: 21 years of experience on average compared with nine in Malawi. 
Family size differs across the two trader populations, with the Beninese ones having more sons, daughters, 
brothers and sisters. Family involvement in trade similarly varies: Beninese traders have more than twice 
as many close relatives involved in trade than Malawian ones.  
The results therefore suggest that involvement in trade is more ancient in Benin. Traders are older, have 
more experience, and have had much exposure to trade from their parents and close relatives. One would 
consequently expect Beninese traders to be more sophisticated and more efficient. Because their 
background is very ‘traditional’, however, the sophistication they can achieve is likely to follow informal 
avenues – building up social networks, and achieving trust through personal relationships (Fafchamps & 
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In contrast, Malawian traders are younger, better educated, and more likely to come from a non-
agricultural or wage employment background. We would therefore expect them to be more ‘modern’, that 
is, more inclined to experiment with new marketing techniques and modern technology such as motorized 
vehicles, telephones and formal contracts. Better education may also enable Malawian traders to delegate 
authority to subordinates and thus to grow and have larger firms.  
4.4 Finance 
Working capital – the money that traders use to buy agricultural products and pay marketing costs – is 
fairly large by the standards of the countries concerned: $1470 in Benin and $560 in Malawi (Table 1). 
These figures are equivalent to two or three times the annual GDP per capita. The median is much smaller, 
at $333 and $136 respectively. We see that, contrary to expectations, working capital is two to three times 
larger in Benin than in Malawi: if profits are larger in Malawi, it is not because Malawian traders use more 
finance. The majority of respondents report augmenting their working capital relative to the previous year, 
reflecting the reinvestment of past earnings.  
 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of surveyed traders 
      Benin Malawi 
Working capital:  Mean  Median  Std. dev.  Mean  Median  Std. dev. 
  Start-up capital (in US$)  166  50  926  80  11  342 
  Current capital (in US$)  1471  333  9341  560  136  1965 
Equipment, number of:           
 Scales  0.13  0  0.52  0.51  0  1.71 
 Processing  equipment  0.11  0  0.58  0.01  0  0.18 
 Non-motorized  transport  0.20  0  0.57  0.82  1  0.96 
 Motorized  transport  0.32  0  1.04  0.08  0  0.39 
  Shop and storage facilities  0.13  0  0.44  0.13  0  0.37 
 Telephones  0.03  0  0.18  0.01  0  0.12 
Human capital           
  No education  68%      10%     
  Number of spoken languages  2.65    1.39  2.14    1.15 
Manpower:           
 Owner(s)  1.2  1  2.7  1.0  1  0.1 
 Family  employees  0.8  0  1.9  0.2  0  0.6 
 Non-family  employees  0.4  0  1.2  0.5  0  1.7 
 Total  manpower  2.2  1  3.7  1.5  1  1.3 
Social capital           
   Membership in trader association  62%        3%       
Source: Survey data             
 
Most working capital comes from internal sources. External finance is extremely limited. Current dues to 
lenders are but a tiny fraction of working capital. Although one fifth to one third of respondents have a 
bank account, only a tiny fraction of them have an overdraft facility. Surprisingly, those with an overdraft 
facility do not appear to make use of it – perhaps because the interest rate is high. Loans from financial 
institutions are rare and heavily concentrated on a small number of large traders. In Malawi, most formal 





The only source of external finance that is used by a sizeable proportion of respondents is loans from 
friends and relatives. A large proportion of surveyed traders (50% in Benin, 75% in Malawi) know a friend 
or relative they can borrow from. The amount they can borrow is moderate – $250 to $300 – and the 
average duration of the loan limited to three months. Although the proportion of traders who claim they 
can borrow is large, in practice very few of them do – 8% of the sample in Benin, 21% in Malawi – and 
they borrow relatively small amounts: $947 on average in Benin, $55 in Malawi. This suggests that loans 
from friends and relatives play primarily an insurance role (e.g. Udry 1994; Fafchamps & Lund 2003).  
For other means of saving, 70% of Beninese traders are members of a rotating saving and credit association 
(ROSCA), compared with only 2% in Malawi. Supplier credit is a much more frequent form of credit than 
any form of external finance. We revisit this issue when we discuss relationships with suppliers and clients.  
4.5 Equipment and buildings 
The surveyed traders appear surprisingly unequipped (Table 1). The overwhelming majority of them do not 
own (serious) weighing equipment, means of transport or storage facilities. At the time of the survey, only 
3% of the total sample had a telephone. Vehicles are clearly the most valuable equipment item. But 
ownership of vehicles is heavily concentrated, with a large proportion of surveyed traders lacking a vehicle 
– 85% in Benin and 94% in Malawi. The total value of vehicles is about nine times higher in Benin than in 
Malawi. Unlike working capital, where we see evidence of increase over time, equipment appears very 
stable, with virtually no change relative to the previous year – a 6% increase only in the total number of 
vehicles, compared to a reported 29% increase in total working capital. These gross investment figures 
overstate aggregate investment, however, since they ignore agents who leave the business. Based on other 
data on enterprise turnover in sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Daniels 1994; Barrett 1997), we suspect that a 
sizeable proportion of traders exit the business in any given year.  
Business premises are few: 59% of Beninese traders and 35% of Malawian traders buy and sell from their 
home, and half of them store their stock there as well. Some of them – 24% of Beninese and 39% of 
Malawian – either own or rent from someone else a dedicated facility outside their home that they use for 
storage. The combined storage capacity of these exclusive use facilities is on average seven metric tons in 
Benin and 12 metric tons in Malawi, but the median is much smaller: 1.4 tons in both countries, or roughly 
15 bags of grain. Half of Beninese and one third of Malawian traders also have access to a collective 
storage facility, usually located at or around the market. In Benin the cost of storage in these facilities is 
about 25 cents per ton per day; in Malawi traders quote a rate of $3 per ton per day, which seems high. 
4.6 Human resources 
In terms of human resources, traders in both countries display similar features to those described for other 
African countries (e.g. Gabre-Madhin 1998; Fafchamps & Minten 1999). Apart from the trader him or 
herself, surveyed enterprises do not employ an abundant manpower, the average total being 2.2 individuals 
in Benin and 1.5 in Malawi (Table 1). Most employees are family members. Non-family employees 
amount to only 0.4 to 0.5 persons on average. Employment levels are also extremely stable, with no 
perceptible trend in employment over time. 
Wages are very low. A large proportion of family workers – around 70% in Benin and 40% in Malawi – 
receive no wage. In contrast, non-family workers nearly always receive a wage. Cases where they do not 
receive a wage probably correspond to apprenticeship contracts. Wage-earning non-family workers receive 
around $7 per month in Benin and $27 in Malawi. The large discrepancy in wage levels may be because 
there are a few large formal employers in the Malawi sample. Unlike micro-enterprise owners, who pay 
notoriously low wages, large African employers are known to pay higher ones (e.g. Velenchik 1997; 
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Traders work long hours. The surveyed trading firms operate an average of 4.7 days a week in Benin and 
6.1 days a week in Malawi. Trading enterprises are very centralized. In addition to the owner, 1.1 persons 
on average are authorized to buy for the firm in Benin and 0.6 in Malawi. Similar though slightly lower 
numbers are reported for those authorized to sell for the firm. On average, the owner is absent for 12 days a 
year in Benin and 46 days in Malawi. Absences are mostly to visit distant purchase and sales markets. In 
most cases, the firm continues to operate in the trader’s absence, normally being run by an employee of the 
firm, preferably a relative – 45% of the cases in Benin, 17% in Malawi. It is common for the trader to rely 
on someone external to the firm – a friend or relative – to look after the business in his or her absence. This 
happens in 48% of absences in Benin and 64% in Malawi. If such a person cannot be found, the business 
closes.  
 
5. Sales and margins 
Now that we have a better sense of what the trading enterprises look like, we examine their activities. 
Median sales do not differ much across the two countries, with the median trader selling $5300 to $6700 
worth of merchandise per year (Table 2). However, the gross margin – the difference between the value of 
sales and purchases – varies significantly between the two countries: it is 2.4 times higher in Malawi than 
in Benin (t-value of 4.83). Median margins differ by the same order of magnitude. Since total sales do not 
differ markedly between the two countries, the higher gross margins in Malawi must come from a larger 
difference between the buying and selling prices.  
 
 
Table 2: Annual sales and margins     
      Benin        Malawi    
  Mean Median Std.  dev  Mean Median  Std.  dev 
Annual purchases ($)  18147  4255  91508  32732  4343  142790 
Annual sales ($)  22872  5323  114660  43611  6729  182197 
Annual gross margin ($)  3123  814  6663  7387  1732  20453 
Gross margin ratio on annual sales  22%  20%  12%  48%  39%  35% 
Gross margin rate on last purchase  23%  19%  24%  53%  40%  61% 
Source:  Survey  data         
 
This is indeed the case: the ratio of selling price over buying price is 1.23 on average in Benin (median of 
1.19) and 1.53 in Malawi (median of 1.40). In other words, the selling price is on average 23% above the 
buying price in Benin but 53% above it in Malawi. This difference is quite significant, with a t-value of 
11.7, and constitutes prima facie evidence that agricultural trade is in general less efficient in Malawi.  
This is somewhat misleading, however. Using the proportion of traders falling into different categories, 
Fafchamps et al. (2005) construct from the same dataset a rough estimate of the average number of 
transactions between farmer and consumer: 3.4 in Benin and 2 in Malawi. The difference is primarily due 
to the proportion of traders who buy from farmers and sell directly to consumers. These estimates are then 
used to guess the average spread between producer and consumer price. The lower number of transactions 
in Malawi implies that this spread need not be larger than in Benin even though the average margin is 
higher. If all traders charge the median margin, the consumer price in Benin would be 76% above the 
farmer price (1.18^3.4=1.76). Similar calculations for Malawi yield consumer prices 96% (1.4^2=1.96) 
above farmer prices. These calculations, however heroic they may be, suggest that differences in gross 
margin rates across countries largely reflect different levels of vertical integration: Malawian traders 





be related to the fact that, unlike their Beninese counterparts, Malawian agricultural traders are 
predominantly male and therefore more mobile.  
Differences in gross margins across countries mask dramatic variation in the volume of activity within 
each country: the Gini coefficient of the total value of annual sales is 0.60 in Benin and 0.38 in Malawi. In 
both countries, the largest surveyed trader sells 2.6 to 2.8 million dollars worth of merchandise a year, 
while 17% of the sample sells less than a thousand dollars worth.  
Margins vary dramatically across traders. Some respondents appear to be making massive losses while 
others make windfall profits. Part of this variation undoubtedly comes from measurement error – since 
respondents do not hold accounts, annual sales and purchases must be extrapolated on the basis of a few 
key indicators. But the variation also suggests that unit margins are extremely volatile. For their last 
transaction, close to 3% of surveyed traders report selling at or below the purchase price. At the other end 
of the spectrum, some traders report selling at close to ten times the purchase price.  
When variable marketing costs are deducted (e.g. transport, loading and off-loading, bagging), 17% of 
surveyed traders report a negative net margin. If we further subtract fixed operations costs and wages to 
construct an approximate annual net margin figure, the differences are even more striking. After 
eliminating the upper and lower 1% of the distribution, we find that 21% of surveyed traders do not cover 
their operations and wage costs out of annual sales (28% in Benin, 15% in Malawi).  
Annual net margins also vary dramatically across countries, with the median net margin in Malawi – $1003 
– nearly ten times higher than in Benin – $119. For most Beninese respondents, trade provides but a small 
return on entrepreneurship and capital. This suggests that competition is fierce in Benin, less so in Malawi.  
5.1 Last purchase 
Information was collected on the last purchase respondents had made. A ‘purchase’ is essentially a load or 
consignment assembled by the trader in the supply market, transported to the sales market and sold over a 
period of time. The average distance between the purchase and the sales markets varies between 53 km in 
Malawi and 69 km in Benin. Median distances are much shorter, however – 15 km in Malawi and 23 km in 
Benin. This means that most agricultural traders travel only short distances to their supply market.  
On average, the consignment is bought from five different suppliers in Benin and 15 in Malawi. The load is 
then sold to various clients – an average of ten in Benin and 50 in Malawi. In two thirds of the cases, the 
trader him or herself traveled to the supply market or markets to oversee the purchase. In nearly all cases, 
the respondent supplies his or her own bags or containers at the time of purchase and the agricultural 
products are transferred from the seller’s bags to the buyer’s.  
On average, the quantity of purchases is remarkably similar across the two countries: around 2.5 metric 
tons of agricultural produce. The value – around $400 – is also surprisingly similar. Medians, however, are 
considerably smaller: 1 ton in Benin, and 420 kg in Malawi – a reminder that the size of businesses 
covered by the survey varies widely.  
Not all quantities purchased had been sold by the time of the survey. On average, surveyed traders had sold 
85 to 90% of the quantities purchased by the time of the interview and had, on average, recouped the value 
of the purchased goods. The number of days elapsed since the last purchase varied significantly between 
the two countries, however: 22 days on average in Benin and eight in Malawi (t-value of 9.6). Medians 
were sizably lower – eight and three days respectively. Ninety percent of surveyed traders keep goods for 
less than a month. This suggests that whatever storage is done by agricultural traders is concentrated in the 
hands of a few. The majority keep the purchased goods for a short period only, typically the time it takes to 
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5.2 Variable costs 
Detailed information was collected on the various costs incurred in the process of assembling, transporting 
and selling the last consignment (Figure 1). In the remainder of this section we refer to these costs as 
variable marketing costs because they vary with the amount purchased and the number of consignments 
sold by the trader over the year. Variable marketing costs represent $18 per ton in Benin and $31 in 
Malawi (t-value of 8.43). Corresponding medians are $16 and $21. This compares to a median purchase 
price of $145 per ton in Benin and $162 in Malawi. Thus, for the median trader, variable marketing costs 
are equivalent to 11 to 13% of the purchase price in both countries.  
 
 























































Figure 1: The composition of marketing costs 
Transport represents by far the largest component of variable cost: 50% in Benin and 39% in Malawi. If we 
add loading and off-loading costs, the commission paid to transport brokers (if any) and payments at road-
blocks, we get a transport share of 60% in Benin and 49% in Malawi. The second most important 
component of variable cost is the travel cost incurred by the trader. This alone represents 15% of variable 
costs in Benin and 37% in Malawi. Transport of goods and of the trader him or herself is thus the most 
important financial outlay associated with an individual purchase.  
Bagging represents another important category of variable costs. The value of bags varies around $4 to $6 
per ton. Bags are recycled and re-used an average of five times in Benin and nine in Malawi, which brings 
down bagging costs. The pro-rated cost of bags and the labor cost of bagging together account for 7 to 10% 
of total variable costs. Taxes assessed on quantities traded account for a very small fraction of variable 
costs: less than 3% of variable costs in both countries. Commissions and tips account for 8% of variable 
costs in Benin but are negligible in Malawi. This reflects a major difference in the role of intermediaries in 
each of the two countries. This is discussed further below. Storage, telephone and other costs account for 
less than 5% of variable costs in both countries. 
5.3 Operating costs 
Data were collected on fixed operating costs. The average costs were about $550 per year in Benin and 
$190 in Malawi. The survey results show that in Benin fixed operating costs are dominated by vehicle 
maintenance and insurance, but these are incurred only by the very small fraction of the trader population 
who own vehicles. The next most important fixed cost category is storage and pest control. These costs 
account for 21% of fixed operating costs in Malawi and 34% in Benin, but they affect only a quarter to a 
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Taxes and fees amount to 44% of operating costs in Malawi, but as little as 5% in Benin. Even in Malawi, 
however, the burden of taxation remains small: $84 a year, compared to an average annual turnover of 
around $43,000. While few traders pay income tax, most pay market fees – 50% in Benin, 80% in Malawi. 
For small traders, market fees are the only form of operating cost they incur. Since market fees do not 
increase proportionally with trade volume, they are relatively more important for small to medium-size 
traders. Market fees are thus a regressive tax. Given that transport represents a large component of traders’ 
costs and taxes a large share of gasoline prices, we suspect that traders probably pay more taxes through 
gasoline than through all other forms of taxation combined.  
Other categories of operating costs such as wages and losses due to theft make small contributions to costs. 
Total wages represent an extra cost of $50 per year in Benin and $110 in Malawi. This amount is very 
small because so few traders employ paid workers and when they do they pay them very little. Very few 
traders borrow money. When they do, they borrow for such short periods that interest charges are, on 
average, negligible. Losses due to theft average $22 a year in both countries.  
It is useful to compare fixed operating costs with variable marketing costs. Annualized marketing costs 
average around $2800 in Benin and $9200 in Malawi. This difference is partly because unit variable costs 
are higher in Malawi and because Malawian traders have a larger turnover on average. What is clear, 
however, is that variable costs represent the bulk of traders’ costs.  
We also collected detailed information on commissions paid to various intermediaries. These costs are in 
principle included in variable costs, but we also collected the information separately. The data confirm that 
commissions are much more frequent in Benin than in Malawi. This is particularly true for buying agents 
and consignment agents. Beninese traders spend on average four times more on commissions than 
Malawian traders do. To verify the information on the costs incurred for personal travel, the information 
was collected separately as well. Results confirm that personal travel represents a sizeable share of total 
costs: 17 to 18% of total variable costs in both countries.  
To summarize, the structure of costs is dominated by transport costs, a large share of which covers the 
trader’s travel to the place of purchase or sale. The need for thousands of traders to travel in person to 
purchase and sales markets – instead of placing an order over the phone – undoubtedly contributes to 
higher trading costs. We examine trading practices in more detail in the next section.  
5.4 Profits 
To conclude this section, we estimate profits from trading. Profit is computed as the annual sales minus 
annual purchases minus annualized variable costs minus wages paid minus operating costs. In case 
agricultural trade only represents part of the surveyed trader’s revenue, annual purchases and sales are 
inflated accordingly. Traders who derive less than 10% of their annual revenue from agricultural trade are 
omitted. The resulting profit represents payments to self-provided factors of production such as working 
capital, owned storage facilities, equipment, vehicles and the unpaid labor of the entrepreneur and family 
helpers.  
Computed profits suffer from severe measurement error. This is because they are obtained by subtracting 
poorly measured costs from poorly measured revenues. Measurement errors therefore tend to compound 
themselves and individual measures of profit should be regarded with caution. Average profits, however, 
should provide a reasonable approximation of what profits from trading must look like in the two surveyed 
countries.  
The results suggest that traders’ profits are not negligible: $1340 on average in Benin, $6140 in Malawi. 
The difference between the two countries is significant (t-value of 6.03). Median profits, however, are 
much lower: $120 in Benin, $1140 in Malawi. This corresponds to an average profit rate on turnover of 6% 





buying and selling prices) in Benin; the corresponding figure for Malawi is 57%.
2 Median profit rates are 
37% and 64% respectively. Since, if anything, Malawian traders have less equipment and working capital 
and use less family labor than their Beninese counterparts, higher profit rates cannot be explained as higher 
payment to self-provided factors of production. It therefore appears that agricultural trade is less 
competitive in Malawi than in Benin. This may be because population density is much lower in Malawi, 
raising the cost of search and helping segment the market.  
These average profit rate figures mask a great deal of variation across traders. A large proportion of 
surveyed traders – 20% – appear to be making losses. On the other hand, some traders appear to be making 
astronomical profits. It is unclear how much of this variation is due to measurement error, but the extent of 
the variation suggests that profits from trade are likely to be very variable. Agricultural trade is a risky 
venture.  
 
6. Trading practices 
We have seen that agricultural traders’ turnover and profitability vary dramatically. The survey results also 
suggest that agricultural trade differs significantly between the two countries. We now examine whether 
these differences are related to differences in trading practices. We begin with ‘technological’ issues such 
as weights and measures, transport and storage and then discuss information gathering, relationships and 
contractual practices.  
6.1 Weights and measures 
Given that only a handful of traders have proper weighing equipment, most trade takes place by volume. In 
practice, volume may be a better way of measuring the value of an agricultural product than weight. 
Indeed, the weight of a crop can be artificially inflated by adding water. Since excess moisture increases 
storage losses, trading by weight tempts farmers not to dry their crops properly before offering them for 
sale. Most crops also tend to desiccate over time without losing (much) of their caloric content. Since water 
can be added when food is prepared for consumption, this is usually not a problem – at least for cereals, 
pulses, groundnuts, and roots and tubers. The same holds for most cash crops. The main exception is fruit 
and vegetables. By using volume instead of weight, traders insure themselves against the most common 
storage loss, weight loss due to desiccation.  
The weight in a given bag obviously varies by crop but, for a given crop, a standard size bag can serve as a 
measurement unit. Traders in Benin and Malawi use burlap and plastic bags in no less than 11 different 
sizes, labeled according to the amount of maize they would contain – from 20 kg to 200 kg. Benin favors 
100 and 200 kg bags, Malawi 50, 70 and 90 kg. Weight measures such as ton are used as well, but in less 
than 10% of all purchases.  
In practice, burlap and plastic bags are not perfect measures of volume, firstly because burlap bags tend to 
stretch, so that older bags may contain more than new ones, and secondly because the amount a bag holds 
varies with the way it is filled and sealed. Measures are thus somewhat subjective since they depend on the 
state of the traders’ bags and the way they are filled. This subjectivity may explain why traders nearly 
always transfer purchased goods from the bags of the seller to their own bags. This is a time-consuming 
and cumbersome process, but it may be essential for the buyer to assess volume. It also enables the buyer 
to assess the quality of the product since, in the transfer process, what was at the bottom of the seller’s bag 
ends at the top of the buyer’s bag and can thus readily be inspected.  
                                                 
2 To minimize bias, this figure is obtained after eliminating traders who do not derive all their revenue from agricultural 
trade. 
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6.2 Transport 
We have seen that transport represents the main cost of trading in agricultural products even though most 
traders source them from nearby villages. One fifth of surveyed traders claim not to use any transport, by 
which they mean that they buy and sell from the same market. The others transport products across 
markets, nearly always with a external transporter.  
Most transport (86%) is done using trucks, half of which are small pick-ups. Some 13% of all transport is 
by non-motorized means of transport such as handcarts and oxcarts – usually in and around markets. Train 
transport is not used by respondent traders in either of the countries studied.  
Measured in dollars per ton per kilometer, transport costs on average $0.43 in Benin and $0.70 in Malawi. 
The costs vary dramatically by mode of transport, however. Non-motorized transport costs on average 
$1.78 per ton/km in Benin and $1.20 in Malawi. In contrast, motorized transport costs $0.28 in Benin and 
$0.63 in Malawi. The latter is similar to the motorized transport cost of $0.67 reported for agricultural 
products in Madagascar (Fafchamps et al. 2005). The difference between the three countries is probably 
due to population density, which is much higher in Benin. Because traffic in passengers and agricultural 
commodities is higher in Benin, transporter idle time is minimized. This reduces transport costs.  
To test for transport efficiency, we regress transport costs on distance and means of transport. We suspect 
that truck transport has a higher fixed cost but lower cost per km than non-motorized transport. To test this 
hypothesis, we let  denote transport costs per kg and assume (Fafchamps et al. 2005):  
        ( 1 )  
where  ,  and  are parameters to be estimated,  is distance,  is load size, and  is an error term. In 
the absence of fixed transport costs with respect to distance,  . In areas with a low density of trade, 
more time is required to fill a large truck since the frequency of transactions is low. Consequently, we 
expect  to be further below 1 in low trade density areas. For the test to be valid, we need to control for 
load size. Indeed, if transport is inefficient, large loads cost less per kg than small loads and the coefficient 
on load size is significantly negative. Transport efficiency requires that  .  
We estimate equation (1) in log form. The results are shown in Table 3. As expected, distance traveled has 
a strongly significant effect on transport cost but  is significantly smaller than 1 in both countries, 
suggesting loading and off-loading costs are high. These costs are higher in Malawi than in Benin, possibly 











Table 3: Determinants of transport costs 
 
     Benin Malawi 
   Unit  Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat. 
 Transaction  size  log  0.015  1.120  -0.091  -4.410 
 Distance  traveled  log  0.749  16.770  0.351  4.860 
Type of transport (non-motorized = omitted category)       
  Pickup truck  yes=1  0.416  4.010  0.023 0.100 
  Truck yes=1  0.501  4.520  -0.424 -1.490 
  Distance x pick-up truck  logxdum  -0.333  -7.840  0.049 0.610 
  Distance x truck  logxdum  -0.352  -8.890  0.130 1.460 
Type of product (cereals = omitted category)        
  Beans and peanuts  yes=1  0.194  1.470  0.549  1.810 
 Roots  and  tubers  yes=1  0.624  3.670  0.558  1.920 
 Fruits  and  vegetables  yes=1  0.508  2.760  -0.306 -0.880 
  Distance x beans and peanuts  logxdum  -0.032  -0.920  -0.105  -1.570 
  Distance x roots and tubers  logxdum  -0.169  -3.850  -0.076 -1.020 
  Distance x fruits and vegetables  logxdum  0.038  0.800  0.264  2.680 
 Intercept    0.096  0.670  1.460  6.630 
            
Number of observations    803    728   
R-squared   0.779    0.391   
            
Joint tests of slope coefficients    F-test p-value F-test p-value 
  Pickup and truck slope coefficients = 0    43.010  0.000 1.360  0.256 
  Pickup = truck slope coefficient    0.300  0.586  1.820  0.177 
Note: Dependent variable is the log of transport cost; estimator is OLS with robust standard errors. 
 
While we find no evidence of returns to load size in Benin, the load size coefficient is significant in 
Malawi: here individual traders transporting larger loads face lower transport costs. Again, this may be 
because the population density is much lower in Malawi. As a result of increased frequency of transport, 
truckers more easily fill their vehicle with loads from multiple traders. With enough competition, this 
ensures that Beninese traders with small loads are not penalized. Our results suggest that transport cost per 
kg could be reduced in Malawi by organizing larger loads.  
To investigate these issues further, we examine whether transport costs vary by mode of transport. To this 
effect, we re-estimate equation (1) separately for motorized and non-motorized transport. We expect to find 
a large  and correspondingly large  for non-motorized transport. For this estimation to yield meaningful 
results, we need to correct for selection bias: presumably traders choose the cheapest mode of transport 
available. To control for this possibility, we estimate a two-step self-selection model (see Maddala 1983: 
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        ( 2 )  
Define  and  with  . A trader selects non-motorized 
transport if  , that is, if  . Vice versa for motorized transport. We thus have: 
        ( 3 )  
with  and   (Maddala 1983). Equation 3 suggests a method for 
obtaining a consistent estimator of  and  : regress the choice of mode of transport on a vector of 
instruments, e.g. trader characteristics; compute the Mills ratios; and regress  and  on  and the Mills 
ratios.  
The results from this procedure are shown in Table 4. The instruments include trader characteristics that 
may affect the choice of transport mode. In both countries, distance traveled increases the probability of 
using motorized transport. Self-selection has a strong effect on the choice of non-motorized transport in 
Benin: without self-selection, the average cost of non-motorized transport would be higher. The self-
selection correction is not significant for Malawi. Previous results for load size are confirmed: non-
significant in Benin; significant and negative in Malawi. Load size has no significant effect on the choice 









                                                 
3 Keep in mind that load size here refers to the load carried by the trader, not the total load on the truck, which often is 





Table 4: Transport costs for motorized and non-motorized transport 
     Benin Malawi 
A. Transportation cost
a    Non-motorized Motorized Non-motorized Motorized 
   Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat. 
 Distance  travelled  log  -0.147 -0.600 0.661 5.820  0.333 1.470 0.383 3.250 
  Distance squared  log ^2  0.145  2.190  -0.034  -2.540  0.038 0.580 0.005 0.230 
 Transaction  size  log  0.004 0.060 0.020 1.250  -0.196  -2.420  -0.070  -2.640 
  Beans and peanuts  yes=1  0.630  2.820  0.062 0.610 0.243 0.440 0.162 1.650 
 Roots  and  tubers  yes=1  0.786 3.050  -0.097  -0.740 0.202 0.670 0.327 3.440 
 Fruits  and  vegetables  yes=1  0.451 1.630 0.438 2.480  -0.418 -1.120  0.706  5.250 
  Mills ratio (from selection equation)  see text  -0.449  -3.640  -0.022 -0.690  0.371  0.670 -0.038 -0.350 
 Intercept    0.759 1.640 0.124 0.540 1.759 1.510 1.348 4.790 
              
 Number  of  observations    74   502   85   627  
 R-squared    0.756   0.539   0.373   0.310  
                
B. Selection equation
b    Benin     Malawi    
  Coef. z-stat.     Coef. z-stat.    
 Distance  travelled  log  2.144 4.540     0.244  1.190    
  Distance squared  log ^2  -0.217  -2.710     0.110  2.430    
 Transaction  size  log  0.004  0.020     0.092  1.180    
  Beans and peanuts  yes=1  -1.166  -0.630      0.573  1.950    
 Roots  and  tubers  yes=1  -0.365 -0.160     0.142  0.580    
 Fruits  and  vegetables  yes=1  -1.001 -0.380     -0.089 -0.280    
Instruments            
 Gender  female=1 -0.677 -1.120     -0.221 -1.030    
  Age  level  -0.010  -0.580    -0.018  -1.910    
 Working  capital  log  0.129  0.590     0.121  1.300    
 Manpower  log  0.523 1.680    -0.086  -0.420    
 Business  contacts  log  0.220  1.440     -0.112 -1.260    
 Value  of  vehicles  log(x+1)  -0.136 -1.470     0.064  1.170    
 Value  of  non-motorized  transport  equipt.. log(x+1)  -0.052 -0.400     -0.091 -1.840    
 Number  of  suppliers    -0.054 -1.940     0.001  0.330    
 Intercept    -1.999 -0.680     -1.244 -1.440    
              
  Number  of  observations    580      727     
  PseudoR-squared    0.835      0.423     
 
a Dependent variation is transport cost in log. 
b Dependent variable is 1 if used motorized transport. 
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We conduct a similar analysis for the choice between small and large trucks, conditional on using 
motorized transport. The results (not shown here to save space) show that, in both countries, large trucks 
are more likely to be used for long distances. In Benin they are also more likely to be used for large 
transactions. The self-selection correction is large and significant for small trucks in Malawi: if traders did 
not self-select away from small trucks, transport in small trucks would be more expensive.  
Taken together, our results suggest that transport follows some economic rationale. Non-motorized 
transport has lower fixed costs and is used primarily for short distances. Motorized transport is used for 
longer distances when it is cheaper. The fact that much transport takes place over short hauls, in small 
trucks or using non-motorized transport, probably contributes to high marketing costs. Increasing returns to 
load size are present in Malawi: there, traders transporting larger loads pay less for transport. This may be 
because lower population density means a lower frequency of transactions, longer waiting time and a 
higher likelihood that trucks do not travel full. Those Malawian traders who do transport larger loads 
obtain higher returns per load because they pay less for transport. In Malawi, transport costs per kg could 
potentially be reduced by organizing larger loads.  
6.3 Storage 
We have seen that most surveyed traders do not store products for long. They typically buy a consignment 
and hold onto it until it is sold, after which they visit their sales market to replenish their stock. Contrary to 
popular belief, the great majority of traders do not undertake speculative or seasonal storage. The average 
stock held is a tiny fraction of annual sales – of the order of 1% on average.  
There is, however, a small minority who are involved in arbitrage across time. Some 10% of traders hold 
stocks for over a month. To estimate returns on storage, we regress the logarithm of the ratio of selling 
price over buying price on days elapsed between purchase and sale. This yields an estimate of the increase 
in gross margin associated with storage. Because of the presence of outliers, the regression is estimated by 
minimizing least absolute deviations instead of least squares, i.e. we report median regression results. To 
avoid omitted variable bias, we control for the size of the transaction and the distance between the place of 
purchase and the place of sale. We also include crop specific dummies, region dummies and dummies for 
the type of trader (e.g. retailer, wholesaler or collector).  
The results are presented in Table 5. Experimenting with different specifications shows that best results are 
achieved when time enters the regression in log form. This means that returns on storage fall over time. 
The results indicate that the return on one week of storage is positive and significant but small: 1% in 
Benin and 2.3% in Malawi. Over 90 days, the estimated average return on storage by traders is quite low – 
2.1% in Benin and 4.9% in Malawi. The difference between the two countries is small, perhaps because 












Table 5: Return to storage        
 
     Benin Malawi 
   Unit  Coef.  t stat.  Coef.  t stat. 
  Days between purchase and sale  log(x+1)  0.005  2.870  0.011  3.440 
Transaction characteristics        
 Transaction  size  log  0.001 0.440 -0.007 -2.950 
  Distance between purchase and sale (km)  log(x+1)  0.004  4.240  0.006  4.300 
Marketing task (collector-retailer=omitted category)     
  Collector yes=1  -0.001  -0.210  -0.033  -4.310 
  Retailer yes=1  -0.019  -2.810  -0.019  -2.130 
  Wholesaler yes=1  -0.025  -4.250  -0.036  -2.500 
Crop type (cereals=omitted category_          
  Beans and pulses  yes=1  -0.015  -3.050  0.018  2.340 
  Roots  and  tubers  yes=1  0.006 1.070 0.111  13.270 
  Fruits and vegetables  yes=1  0.014  2.010  0.039  2.770 
Region dummies (north=omitted category)         
  Central yes=1  0.018  4.360  0.003 0.470 
  South yes=1  0.021  5.500  0.008 0.970 
  Intercept   0.054  5.990  0.139  9.400 
          
Number  of  observations    517   518  
Pseudo  R-squared    0.114   0.155  
          
Note: Dependent variable is log of ratio of sales price over purchase price; estimator is median regression. 
 
These results indicate that average returns on storage are not as large as often reported in the popular press, 
which is probably why so few traders bother to store their stock over long periods. Storage is also a very 
risky activity since realized returns can vary widely around these expected returns. Larger returns can 
probably be achieved by rotating one’s working capital faster instead of immobilizing it in idle stocks.  
6.4 Suppliers and clients 
Another important dimension of trade as a business is the relationships traders have with their suppliers 
and clients. The overwhelming majority of surveyed traders have regular suppliers and clients: 6.5 
suppliers and 7 clients in Benin; 11 suppliers and 15 clients in Malawi. Respondents do close to half of 
their business with these few individuals. Trade is thus very personalized, as already emphasized by 
Fafchamps (2004).  
Networks of traders play an important role in the movement of agricultural products. As far as their 
composition is concerned, ethnic concentration appears less prevalent than often assumed (as pointed out 
by Fafchamps 2002). Less than half the regular suppliers and clients are from the same ethnic group or 
religion as the respondent. Only a tiny proportion of regulars are relatives. Contrary to what is claimed by 
Fisman (2001) regarding manufacturing networks in Africa or by Granovetter (1995) regarding immigrant 
business networks in the US, business relationships among African traders are not primarily built on the 
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Respondents meet outside business with about a quarter of their regular suppliers and clients in Benin, but 
only 8 to 15% of them in Malawi. Social interaction is primarily through business. Some 12% of Beninese 
suppliers and clients sell exclusively to or buy exclusively from the respondent. The equivalent figure for 
Malawi is 23%. In contrast, respondents almost never see themselves as bound to trade only with regulars. 
Relational contracting does not imply vertical integration.  
Regarding transaction methods, payment in cash is universal. Payment in foreign currency or in kind 
occurs only very rarely. Payment by check is unheard of. Supplier credit is moderately common in Benin 
but fairly rare in Malawi. In Benin, respondents state that close to a quarter of their purchases and sales are 
made on credit. Sixty percent of respondents claim to be given credit by at least some of their suppliers and 
three quarters of them extend credit to at least some of their clients. The corresponding percentages in 
Malawi are much lower: purchases on credit account for only 3% of total purchases and credit sales 
amount to only 11% of all sales. Some 85% of Malawian traders claim never to receive credit from 
suppliers and one third never grant any credit to clients.  
Outstanding balances to suppliers are very small: $24 in Benin, nil in Malawi. This is probably because 
trade credit is of very short duration: 6 to 8 days on average with suppliers, 9 to 11 days on average with 
clients. In the overwhelming majority of cases, traders do not charge a different price if they sell for cash 
or on credit. Discussions with respondents suggest that sales on credit correspond to large quantities. Credit 
seems to be used to incite the buyer to buy more. In this context, waiving interest on trade credit is like 
offering a quantity discount.  
Some traders also extend credit to farmers: 25% of traders in Benin, fewer than 10% in Malawi. Purchase 
with advance payment to farmers represents a minute proportion of total purchases – 4% in Benin, 2% in 
Malawi. Crop prices are either set in advance (40% of cases in Benin, 75% in Malawi) or set equal to the 
market price at the time of delivery. Prices are negotiated at delivery only in a handful of cases. Only in 16 
to 24% of the advance payment cases do credit and cash prices differ. When they do, median cash prices 
are 14% higher than credit prices. Credit duration is somewhat longer than with traders – 14 days on 
average with a median of 7 days – but it is certainly shorter than the agricultural season. Surveyed traders 
therefore are not in the business of financing agricultural production. Advances to farmers seem to be a 
way for traders to secure sufficient quantities and plan their activities from one week to the next. We 
therefore find little evidence that advances to farmers hide ‘exploitative’ practices by traders (Crow & 
Murshid 1994).  
6.5 Networks and associations 
We have seen that traders maintain close relationships with a small number of suppliers and clients. Their 
network, however, is not limited to trading partners. Respondents know on average 37 to 42 other traders, 
split more or less equally between purchase and sales markets. Median figures are 23 for Benin and 20 for 
Malawi. The two countries, however, differ in the number of traders respondents knew at start-up: 17 on 
average in Benin but only six in Malawi. This undoubtedly reflects Beninese respondents’ more extensive 
prior exposure to agricultural trade.  
The two countries also differ in the extent of associative life. Two thirds of Beninese traders are member of 
a trader association, compared to only 3% of Malawian traders, and have been members for seven years on 
average compared to three in Malawi. Beninese associations count many more members – 188 on average 
compared with 29 in Malawi – and Beninese traders pay association fees equivalent to $6 a year, while 
Malawian traders pay nothing. The average number of association members who are also trading partners 
of the respondent is 34 in Benin compared to only seven in Malawi. Traders’ associations thus play a much 
more prominent role in Benin.  
Regarding the perceived advantages of being part of an association, by far the most important reasons are 





commercial disputes. These factors account for 55% of the responses in Benin and 46% in Malawi. 
Restricting competition is also in the traders’ minds, especially in Benin: 29% of the Beninese traders and 
16% of the Malawian ones cite various restrictions on competition (e.g. price fixing, restricting entry, 
coordinating purchases and sales) as the main advantage they derive from their membership in traders’ 
associations. Dealing with external forces is also an important motivation (e.g. negotiating with 
government, access to credit, group orders), accounting for 15% of the Beninese responses and 35% of the 
Malawian.  
6.6 Intermediaries 
Intermediaries – brokers, buying agents and consignment agents – are a substitute for networks: instead of 
knowing lots of potential buyers, a trader might choose to know a single agent who sells to all of them. To 
investigate these issues, data were collected on the use of intermediaries. The results indicate that 
intermediaries are much more frequently used in Benin than in Malawi: 31% of Beninese traders use 
buying agents; 26% use consignment agents. The corresponding numbers are 6% and 0% in Malawi. The 
only category of intermediaries where the two countries are more or less similar is brokers: 8% of Beninese 
traders use them, compared with 3% of the Malawians. Some 70% of Beninese traders also use an 
intermediate category called ‘apprentice’. Although not strictly speaking agents, apprentices straddle the 
employee and agent categories. In practice they are encouraged to use their initiative and are employed as 
selling agents. In two thirds of the cases, apprentices are close relatives. On average Beninese traders deal 
with two such apprentices.  
Similar figures come to light if we focus on the last purchase only. We find that 31% of Beninese traders 
use an agent to buy agricultural products compared with only 3% of Malawian ones. On the selling side, 
27% of Beninese traders use an agent, compared with 3% in Malawi. In Benin, the selling agent is half the 
time a broker, half the time an apprentice.  
The total number of agents used also varies significantly across the two countries, with Beninese traders 
using a much larger number of agents, especially buying agents and apprentices, and having a longer 
period of acquaintance with them – 2.2 years with their buying agents, as opposed to only one month’s 
acquaintance in Malawi. Malawian agents are portrayed as rather similar to the respondent in origin, 
ethnicity and religion. Social interaction outside business is also more likely than in Benin, and agents are 
more likely to be close relatives and to operate exclusively for the respondent. In contrast, Beninese agents 
appear to be as different from the respondent as are the regular clients and suppliers.  
From this information, we conclude that in Benin the use of intermediaries is more common and agents 
more easily trusted than in Malawi. In contrast, Malawian respondents deal with few agents and do so only 
sporadically, when the agent is someone with whom they can identify more than with the general closely 
trader population.  
6.7 Information gathering and search 
Next we examine how traders collect information about prices and market conditions, and how they search 
for suppliers and clients. The average agricultural trader follows (a little over) two agricultural products 
regularly. He or she also regularly follows two supply markets and (a little over) one sales market. This is 
consistent with the observed pattern by which most surveyed traders are located in their sales market and 
source their products from a small number of nearly supply markets.  
Surveyed traders regularly consult an average of three people in Benin – seven in Malawi – to collect 
information about prices. More people are consulted about the trader’s main market (which is typically a 
sales market) than about other markets (which are typically supply sources), probably because the trader 
spends more time on his main sales market. Tracking the ongoing selling price closely is essential to get 
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one worker per trading enterprise is actively involved in collecting price information. Given the small size 
of trading firms, this means that most employees are involved in one way or another in monitoring price 
movements. In Benin, 54% of traders estimate they are able to collect reliable information about current 
prices on supply markets without having to visit them and 78% of Malawian traders make the same claim.  
We asked respondents to report the main source of information on prices in their main market and other 
markets. Talking to other traders is by far the major source of information on prices either in one’s home 
market or in other markets. In the home market, 64% of Beninese traders and 84% of Malawian ones report 
conversations with other traders, including clients and suppliers, as their main source of information about 
prices in their home market. Surprisingly, intermediaries are hardly ever mentioned. The surveyed traders 
do not rely on agents to quote reliable prices. In Malawi, 7% of respondents say they do not need to collect 
information because they set their own price.  
Regarding other markets, talking to traders is again the main source of information. Suppliers are reported 
as a major source of information by one third of Malawian traders. This is a priori surprising since 
suppliers have an incentive to overestimate the price. The radio is cited as a main source of information by 
8% of Malawian traders. One quarter of Beninese traders and 10% of Malawian rely on personal 
observation – which means that they physically visit the market, eavesdrop, or act as a potential customer 
to get price quotes.  
Keeping in touch with other markets takes more effort than just talking with a few traders. One important 
factor in this state of affairs is the extremely low use of telephones: at the time of the survey, agricultural 
traders were placing, on average, four to eight business-related calls a year. This is an extremely low 
frequency, but is likely to have changed since cellular phones have become more widely available in 
Africa.  
Personal visits to other purchase and sales markets make up for the lack of telephones. Surveyed traders 
make an average of 250 trips a year to these markets in Benin and 92 trips a year in Malawi. The 
corresponding medians are 133 (Benin) and 52 (Malawi). In Benin, most trips are to sales markets; in 
Malawi, three quarters of the trips are to supply markets. As mentioned earlier, the cumulated annual cost 
of these trips represents a major cost for traders.  
The high frequency of travel means that traders are often absent from their home market. Given that they 
do not use telephones, they cannot easily keep in touch with conditions in their home market while they are 
away. The need to travel frequently to supply markets probably explains why traders source products 
primarily from nearby markets.  
6.8 Contractual performance 
We have already discussed many of the dimensions of exchange – prices, quantities, credit, intermediaries, 
etc. A few contractual performance issues nevertheless remain. We begin by noting that surveyed traders 
trade in non-standardized products. By their own account, three quarters of them deal in products with 
multiple varieties. Two thirds also state that the product they sell varies in quality. Differences in variety 
and quality are associated with price differences. The coefficient of variation of prices due to quality and 
variety differences is 0.13 in Benin and 0.10 in Malawi (median 0.12 and 0.07). This means that a trader 
could lose most of his or her margin by purchasing a product of poor quality or the wrong variety. 
Assessment of the product is thus essential.  
Direct inspection is the only method by which surveyed traders assess quality. Only a handful of traders 
(ten out of more than 2000 responses) say they rely on the supplier to identify the variety and assess the 
quality. Only one respondent stated that he relies on the packaging. These findings are similar to those 
reported by Fafchamps and Minten (2001) for Madagascar and in contrast to results reported by Tripp and 





consuming. Since it requires experience and familiarity, it may be hazardous to delegate this function to 
inexperienced or unmotivated employees. Quality control is thus likely to be a major obstacle to business 
expansion.  
Next we examine the incidence of contractual disputes. Respondents were asked to report the number of 
cases of contract non-performance they encountered in the year preceding the survey. The results indicate a 
much higher incidence of contractual non-performance in Malawi than in Benin (Table 6). In Benin, 
traders only report a handful of cases of bad quality, disagreement over measures, or ex post price 
renegotiation with suppliers. In contrast, Malawian traders report close to 200 such occurrences per year – 
roughly 6% of purchases. Because Malawian traders are more likely to place orders with suppliers, they are 
also more likely to encounter late or non-delivery problems. In fact, the probability of non-performance on 
orders appears to be quite high. Given that the placement of orders is more likely when the market is tight, 
this is hardly surprising. It does, however, serve as a reminder that contracts are conceived by surveyed 




Table 6: Contractual disputes     
      Benin  Malawi 
With suppliers:     
Percentage of traders experiencing cases of:       
 Bad  quality  3%  41% 
 Disagreement  over  measuring  7%  35% 
 Renegotiate  price  12%  25% 
Placing orders:    
  % of traders who place orders  6%  32% 
  Proportion of purchases on order  1.20%  6.30% 
Of those placing orders, % of traders experiencing:    
 Late  delivery  18%  41% 
 Partial  delivery  20%  31% 
 No  delivery  16%  27% 
      
With clients:     
Percentage of traders experiencing cases of:    
 Late  payment  24%  42% 
 Partial  payment  21%  34% 
 Non-payment  20%  25% 
  Attempt to renegotiate price ex post  5%  20% 
Average number of:    
  Cases of late payment per year  10.8  15.2 
  Cases of partial payment per year  9.8  14.9 
  Cases of no payment per year  0.9  7.1 
   Cases of price renegotiation per year  0.4  116 
The two countries are more similar on the selling side, although the frequency of payment problems is 
about twice as high in Malawi as in Benin. Malawian traders are also much more likely to mention efforts 
by clients to renegotiate prices ex post. The frequency of payment problems is very low in both countries – 
of the order of 0.5 to 0.6% of transactions. Surveyed traders have on average one person in the firm dealing 
with debt collection. The fear of losing one’s reputation might be a deterrent to non-payment: 53% of 
Beninese traders and 70% of Malawian state that other suppliers would get to know if a client would not 
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6.9 Protection of property 
We end with a short description of how surveyed traders protect their property. In the year preceding the 
survey, 16% of Beninese traders and 33% of Malawian were victims of theft. This is higher than the 
incidence of theft reported in Fafchamps & Minten (2001) for Madagascar. The value of stolen property 
was fairly low: $22 per year on average. Some traders, however, incurred much higher losses – of the order 
of $2500 in each country.  
Few respondents directly blame employees for the thefts, but only 62% of Beninese traders are confident 
that employees were not involved (72% in Malawi). Contrary to what Fafchamps and Minten (2001) report 
for Madagascar, fear of pilferage does not discourage traders from hiring employees: only 3% of Beninese 
respondents and 11% of Malawian say they refrain from hiring additional employees for fear of theft.  
The method most commonly used to protect one’s property is to lock the store at night (75% of those who 
store in Benin, 87% in Malawi), hire a guard (40% and 28% respectively) and sleep on the premises (19% 
and 48% respectively). For those who transport, some protection is occasionally sought as well: some 
traders travel in convoy (10% in Benin, 19% in Malawi); some avoid particular routes (8% in Benin, 17% 
in Malawi); and some hire guards during transport (4% and 17%). Protection during transport thus appears 
slightly more problematic in Malawi, possibly because the country is less densely populated and ambush is 
easier to organize.  
 
7. Conclusions 
We have given a detailed description of how agricultural traders operate in Benin and Malawi, two 
countries fairly representative of western and eastern/southern Africa. Many of the features we have 
documented were well known – small size of businesses, lack of equipment, rudimentary business 
practices, dominant role of transport costs. Other features were less well known, such as the important of 
personal travel, bagging practices, the short distance over which most traders operate, and the incidence of 
theft and breach of contract.  
We were also able to dispel some myths. For instance we documented the absence of speculative, inter-
seasonal storage for the overwhelming majority of traders, and the relatively low returns on storage in 
general. We showed that advances from traders to farmers are of short duration – one to two weeks. Their 
main purpose is not to exploit farmers’ need for cash to finance agricultural production but rather to secure 
future deliveries.  
The picture that emerges from this analysis is dominated by search, quality control and transport – for 
goods and for people. Because trading enterprises are small, the quantities they can gather from any one 
market are limited by what the trader can reliably locate, finance and inspect. As a result, transport is by 
small vehicles – pick-up trucks for the most part. An inordinate amount of personal travel takes place as 
well, since traders must inspect the goods they purchase and payment is normally cash on delivery.  
As found by Fafchamps et al. (2005), surveyed traders appear to work effectively under the constraints 
they face, which are many – e.g. limited finance, no brand names and trademarks, no certified quality, no 
organized commodity exchange, extremely decentralized production and consumption. They rely on 
networks to share information and discourage breach of contract and are able to perform an essential 
trading function in a flexible and expeditious manner. But the end result nevertheless is a costly system that 
provides only a limited service to consumers and producers.  
The modernization of agricultural trade in the countries studied requires that original solutions be found to 





the survey are motorized transport and, to a lesser extent, pest control. Telephones and banks are ignored. 
Brand recognition, grading and quality certification are non-existent. Brokers and agents are not organized 
in commodity exchanges. Quantities are not pooled for transport and storage so as to achieve returns to 
scale. Inter-seasonal and inter-regional arbitrage are outside the purview of most traders, who prefer to 
operate in a small territory on a day-to-day basis. An entire continent is fed using a market set-up similar to 
that described, for instance, by Greif (1993) and Braudel (1986) for Europe and the Mediterranean 
hundreds of years ago.  
 
8. Policy implications 
The results presented here suggest that policy interventions can be envisaged in four main areas: increasing 
traders’ access to modern marketing equipment; reducing transaction risk by improving contract 
enforcement institutions; promoting more sophisticated business practices such as grading, quality 
certification and trade credit; and reducing physical marketing costs by improving roads and transport 
services.  
We were surprised by the virtual absence of scales and processing equipment (such as grain dryers and 
grading machines) and the reliance on small-scale home storage. One possible interpretation is that traders 
do not invest in such equipment because it is not profitable. This may be true for small traders but is 
unlikely to be correct for large trading firms. We believe these avenues should be explored. One should 
keep in mind, however, that better equipped and hopefully more efficient large traders could drive out of 
business some of the small traders, who are predominantly women.  
Improving access to external finance should also be attempted. It is shocking, for instance, to note that 
large traders do not even have an overdraft facility. For certain traders – those with adequate experience 
and good business contacts – access to more finance would undeniably help them grow and prosper. But 
we are not convinced that increasing widespread access to external finance would improve the efficiency 
of agricultural markets in general. Easier finance may help some traders increase their market share and 
eliminate competitors. But this need not result in lower prices for consumers or higher prices for producers 
if there are no increasing returns in agricultural trade. The work of Fafchamps et al. (2005) suggests that, at 
the low levels of technology found in the two studied countries, there are no increasing returns to scale in 
agricultural trade. We suspect this is because business practices remain quite rudimentary, making it 
difficult for trading operations to grow beyond a certain size while remaining competitive.  
The results presented here and in Fafchamps (2004) show that these rudimentary business practices can 
largely be blamed on transaction risk. Payment takes place on delivery, a practice that precludes invoicing 
and payment by check and complicates accounting. Goods have to be inspected upon delivery because the 
supplier is not trusted to provide a reliable account of the quality and quantity (Fafchamps et al. 2006). 
Grain has to be physically moved from one bag to another at each sale transaction. This facilitates 
inspection but increases costs and slows down trade. Business networks have developed as a partial 
palliative to these problems, but they are insufficient to eliminate them.  
It is not entirely clear how in practice transaction risk can be reduced. The court system by itself is unlikely 
to suffice because agricultural market transactions are seldom large enough to justify court action, 
assuming that a breach of contract can be demonstrated and the defendant has assets that can be foreclosed 
upon. One institutional innovation that could potentially reduce transaction risk is for market authorities to 
take a proactive stance. Membership in traders’ associations could in principle be used as a guarantee of 
good conduct. Traders shown to breach contracts would be ousted from the association. The existence of 
trader associations in Benin suggests that such an approach might be made possible by strengthening and 
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Traders’ associations could also intervene in grading and quality certification. An association equipped 
with a grain dryer and simple grading equipment could bag and certify its products in a manner that would 
be difficult to falsify. Reassured about the quality of the goods they purchase, buyers might be more 
willing to place orders by phone, thereby saving on transactions costs.  
Another approach is to focus on agents and brokers who could, in principle, serve as an essential link 
between unknown buyers and sellers. Gabre-Madhin (1998) has documented how this system works in the 
Ethiopian grain market. A core of experienced brokers would be required before a commodity exchange 
could be set up. The existence of such an exchange would in turn help circulate information by publicizing 
current and future grain prices. As a first step towards creating a commodity exchange in Benin and 
Malawi, it is desirable to assist the emergence of grain brokers and to encourage grading and quality 
certification by traders’ associations.  
It is also important to promote sound business practices. Beninese and Malawian traders manage to feed 
their populations by collecting and distributing food among millions of producers and consumers. They do 
so in difficult circumstances and demonstrate great ingenuity. Perhaps even more remarkably, many of 
them appear to make a living from their trade. All this notwithstanding, business practices appear 
inefficient. Exchange takes a cumbersome form that allows a myriad small traders to compete with larger 
ones. The cumbersome practices increase the cost of the entire marketing system.  
The question is how to capture increasing returns to scale from modern trading practices. Put differently, 
how can we enable large traders to adopt modern transaction methods so they can reduce their costs and 
drive small traders out? One possibility is to favor large traders directly, for instance through credit 
programs and restricted entry. These policies have been tried elsewhere and have generally failed to induce 
large traders to modernize and become more efficient. Another approach is to support the modernization of 
trading practices irrespective of firm size. If modern practices are, as we expect, efficiency enhancing, 
those traders who begin using them should grow and eventually displace others. One example of such an 
approach would be to upgrade markets by providing cheap good quality sacks and making loading and off-
loading easier. Simple processing equipment could be made available to traders in exchange for a user fee. 
Some experimentation will be required to identify the right sequence of innovations.  
Physical marketing costs constitute the bulk of traders’ costs. Many of these costs are ultimately the result 
of transaction costs (e.g. the need for traders to travel to the point of purchase and sale). But there is ample 
scope for lowering marketing costs by reducing transport costs. Various policies could be used. Direct 
measures such as reducing gasoline taxes would undoubtedly have an effect, but at the expense of much 
needed government revenue. Measures to improve the maintenance of rural feeder roads are urgently 
needed. Devolving maintenance to local administration is an option worth studying, as is the creation of 
toll roads to finance maintenance costs.  
Another innovation worth exploring is the expansion of transport brokerage services. We have shown that 
transport costs can be reduced by using large trucks over longer distances. This is currently difficult 
because of the small size and decentralized nature of traders’ operations. Transport brokers would take 
possession of cargo, rent out space on large trucks, and deliver to traders in their sales market. These 
practices are already present but insufficiently widespread. We suspect that the fear of breach of contract is 
a strong obstacle to their development. Better trust between traders and transport brokers would simplify 
the organization of transport, thereby reducing costs.  
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